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The likelihood of an outcome (uncertainty or sureness) and the similarity between choices 
(conflict or ease of a decision) are often critical to decision making. We often ask ourselves: 
how likely are we to win or lose?  And how different is this option’s likelihood from the 
other?  Uncertainty is a characteristic of the stimulus and conflict between stimuli, but these 
dissociable processes are often confounded. Here, applying a novel hierarchical drift 
diffusion approach, we study their interaction using a sequential learning task in healthy 
volunteers and pathological groups characterized by compulsive behaviours, by posing it as 
an evidence accumulation problem. The variables, Conflict- difficult or easy (difference 
between reward probabilities of the stimuli) and Uncertainty- low, medium or high (inverse 
U-shaped probability-uncertainty function) were then used to extract threshold (‘a’- amount 
of evidence accumulated before making a decision) and drift rate (‘v’- information processing 
speed) parameters. Critically, when a decision was both difficult (high conflict) and 
uncertain, relative to other conditions, healthy volunteers unexpectedly accumulated less 
evidence with lower decision thresholds and accuracy rates at chance levels.  In contrast, 
patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder had slower processing speeds during these 
difficult uncertain decisions; yet, despite this more cautious approach, performed sub-
optimally with poorer accuracy relative to healthy volunteers below that of chance level. 
Thus, faced with a difficult uncertain decision, healthy controls are capable of rapid possibly 
random decisions, displaying almost a willingness to ‘walk away’, whereas those with 
obsessive compulsive disorder become more deliberative and cautious but despite appearing 
to learn the differential contingencies, still perform poorly.  These observations might 
underlie disordered behaviours characterized by pathological uncertainty or doubt despite 
compulsive checking with impaired performance.  In contrast, alcohol dependent subjects 
show a different pattern relative to healthy controls with difficulties in adjusting their 
behavioural patterns with slower drift rates or processing speed despite decisions being easy 
or low conflict. We emphasize the multidimensional nature of compulsive behaviours and the 
utility of computational models in detecting subtle underlying processes relative to 
behavioural measures. These observations have implications for targeted behavioural 
interventions for specific cognitive impairments across psychiatric disorders. 
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AD- Alcohol dependent 
HV- Healthy volunteers 
HDDM – Hierarchical drift diffusion model 
HC- High Conflict 
HU- High Uncertainty 
HCHU- High Conflict High Uncertainty 
HCMU- High Conflict Medium Uncertainty 
HCLU- High Conflict Low Uncertainty 
LC- Low Conflict 
LU- Low Uncertainty 
LCMU- Low Conflict Medium Uncertainty 
LCLU- Low Conflict Low Uncertainty 
MU- Medium Uncertainty 

















Running head: DISSOCIATING CONFLICT AND UNCERTAINTY                                                                     4 
 
Introduction 
Uncertainty and conflict are intrinsic to our daily decisions. Uncertainty is related to 
the likelihood of an outcome (sureness) and conflict (ease) to the degree of similarity between 
choices. The constructs are commonly related and often conflated, but can be dissociated 
experimentally(Volz et al., 2003, 2004). How we accumulate and evaluate the evidence prior 
to making a decision in the context of conflict or uncertainty is relevant both to our daily 
decision making and disorders of pathology characterized by impulsive or compulsive 
behaviours(Voon et al., 2016; Voon et al., 2017). The effect of evidence accumulation on 
decision making behaviours exist as a continuum contributing to either decisional impulsivity 
on one end characterized by rapid poorly considered decisions(FitzGerald et al., 2015; 
Forstmann et al., 2016) and on the other, may lead to repeated compulsive checking 
behaviour with doubt, overestimation and indecisiveness(Sarig et al., 2012; Newark, 2014; 
Nestadt et al., 2016).  Why evidence accumulation is impaired is mechanistically critical and 
is dependent on the context.  Here we consider conflict and uncertainty, two constructs 
influencing evidence accumulation. 
Uncertainty can be quantified as the variance of a probability distribution, (Schultz et 
al., 2008) following an inverted U-shaped curve across probabilities(P): the lower the 
variance, the closer to certainty(e.g. P closer to either 0 or 1) and the higher the variance, the 
closer to uncertainty(e.g. P=0.5) or randomness(Schultz et al., 2008).   Conflict can arise in 
multiple scenarios that enable us to classify it as an easy or difficult decision. Conflict can be 
perceptual (e.g. random kinetic dots in which subjects decide the direction of moving dots 
with varying likelihood)(Banca et al., 2015), probabilistic(e.g. choosing between two options 
with different reward probabilities)(Frank et al., 2007), or prepotent response based(e.g. the 
Flanker or Stroop task where a prepotent response must be suppressed)(Banca et al., 2015). 
In tasks involving perceptual conflict such as the random dots kinetic task, objective 
uncertainty cannot be dissociated from conflict.  
The role of uncertainty and conflict in disorders of repetitive pathological behaviours 
such as obsessive-compulsive disorder(OCD) and Alcohol dependence(AD) remains unclear.  
OCD is characterized by repetitive intrusive thoughts or obsessions and repetitive actions or 
compulsions to alleviate the anxiety related to the obsession. The symptoms of OCD have 
been suggested to be rooted in uncertainty in which obsessions reflect pathological doubt and 
compulsive choices potentially worsening the doubt(van den Hout and Kindt, 2003a, b; 
Hermans et al., 2008) and the associated level of confidence(Dar, 2004). The repetitive 
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‘checking’ behaviour intended to decrease the doubt associated with an action/state 
paradoxically only worsens the subjective uncertainty(Dar, 2004; van den Hout and Kindt, 
2004). Using an implicit zero uncertain condition in a probabilistic deck drawing 
paradigm(Stern et al., 2010) in which the subjects identified the card deck from which the 4 
cards were drawn and rated the certainty of their decision, OCD patients were shown to 
experience higher subjective uncertainty with no differences in objective uncertainty 
compared to healthy volunteers (HV)(Stern et al., 2013). However, not all studies support 
this theory of uncertainty intolerance in OCD(Sarawgi et al., 2013; Toffolo et al., 2014; 
Pushkarskaya et al., 2015).  
Similarly, the role of conflict in OCD is not completely clear with mixed results 
reported.  Studies show either greater sensitivity with reaction time(Banca et al., 2015) or no 
differences in accuracy(Banca et al., 2015) in Stroop and probabilistic reward learning 
tasks(Frank et al., 2007; Banca et al., 2015) compared to HV. Studies commonly show mixed 
or no behavioural differences in conflict based measures but more consistently demonstrate 
neurophysiological differences with event-related potential(N2) and task based functional 
magnetic resonance imaging show dysfunctional hyperactive monitoring irrespective of the 
conflict level(Riesel et al., 2017).  Furthermore, impaired conflict based error monitoring has 
been suggested as an underlying neurocognitive endo-phenotype with greater dorsal cingulate 
activity(Agam et al., 2014) in both OCD patients(Ursu et al., 2003; Endrass et al., 2008) and 
their unaffected family members(Riesel et al., 2011; Carrasco et al., 2013).  The rationale for 
this current study was motivated by our previous study in OCD addressing behavioural 
differences as a function of conflict and uncertainty.  We did not show any differences as a 
function of conflict in either a Stroop or probabilistic reward learning task but demonstrated 
using a random dot motion task both increased response times and a heightened decision 
threshold to greater randomness compared to HV(Banca et al., 2015).  In the random dot 
motion task, subjects make a decision whether moving dots with differing degrees of 
coherence appear to be moving right or left.  We had interpreted the findings as secondary to 
uncertainty given that there were no differences as a function of conflict in the other two 
tasks; however notably the task is unable to dissociate perceptual uncertainty and conflict.  
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Similarly, the context of uncertainty and conflict are also highly relevant in AD with 
slower response times, higher interference scores(Goudriaan et al., 2006)  and lower accuracy 
rates in the incongruent high conflict condition of the Stroop task(Dao-Castellana et al., 
1998; Pitel et al., 2007) and show higher uncertainty tolerance(Lawrence et al., 2009a, b).  
However, given previous experimental designs, the effect of conflict is difficult to dissociate 
from the influence of uncertainty; thus, whether OCD and AD subjects have impairment in 
conflict or uncertainty remains unclear(Schlösser et al., 2010; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2012). 
Here, we leverage the two-step sequential learning task(Daw et al., 2011) originally 
designed to dissociate model-based goal-directed from model-free habit control(Daw et al., 
2011; Voon et al., 2015) to assess evidence accumulation dissociating the concepts of 
conflict and uncertainty(Figure-1a). We employed a novel approach using the second stage 
stimulus-pair reward probabilities of the task(Figure-1a) and the hierarchical drift diffusion 
model(HDDM)(Wiecki et al., 2013), a Bayesian based drift diffusion model.  HDDM is 
considered to be one of the best methods to analyse 2-choice tasks(Voss et al., 2013; 
Forstmann et al., 2016) with the estimated parameters directly mapping on to psychological 
constructs(Voss et al., 2013). HDDM’s hierarchical nature has the advantage of 
simultaneously estimating multiple group distributions(HV, OCD and AD) and inter-subject 
differences within each group(Wiecki et al., 2013). The study focuses on the second stage 
reward probabilities alone and with respect to this particular analysis can be viewed as a 
value learning task.   
We first show that conflict and uncertainty are potentially dissociable. We then 
analysed the responses of OCD and AD patients with the aim to identify their sensitivity 
towards conflict and uncertainty when compared to HV participants.  We hypothesized that 
OCD subjects would show greater behavioural impairments in the context of uncertainty and 




A total of 243 participants(173-HV, 32-OCD and 38-AD subjects) were recruited and 
have been previously described(Voon et al., 2015). Subjects were included if they were 
above 18 years of age. For HV, the exclusion criteria were any serious medical, neurological 
or psychiatric illnesses, or head injury or the use of psychotropic medications. For OCD and 
AD, the exclusion criteria were similar except a current mild depression was allowed as was 
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antidepressant use.  Subjects were screened using a structured clinical interview (Mini 
International Neuropsychiatric Inventory)(Amorim et al., 1998).  All participants completed 
the Beck Depression Inventory(Beck and Steer, 1987); and the State and Trait Anxiety 
Inventory(Spielberger, 1985). The study was approved by the University of Cambridge 
Research Ethics Committee and written informed consent was obtained before the start of the 
experiment. Participants completed the behavioural task and were compensated for their time 
and performance.  
 
The sequential learning task 
The sequential learning task(Daw et al., 2011) consisted of two stages; subjects chose 
between a stimulus-pair at stage 1 which led to one of two stimuli-pairs with a fixed 
probability (P=0.70 or 0.30). Choice of a stimulus at stage 2 led to a reward (£1 or no reward) 
with probability gradually shifting based on a random Gaussian walk(P=0.25 to 0.75, Figure 
1a). Subjects were allowed a decision time of 2 seconds at each stage, 1.5 second transition 
time between stages and observed the outcome for 1 second. Participants underwent a 
computerized self-paced training lasting 15 to 20 minutes and all completed three sessions. 
 
Conflict and Uncertainty  
The reward probabilities of the stage 2 stimuli were used to calculate a measure of 
conflict per trial. The conflict variable(C) was based on the degree of similarity or 
dissimilarity between reward probabilities for each stimulus-pair(Figure-1c, e.g. Low 

















   (1) 
Where i




jP is the reward probabilities of the transitioned 
stimuli 1 and 2 at stage 2 for trial i and subject j.  
The conflict variable was normalized such that a low value of C(=0.1) would indicate 
a LC trial and a higher value(=0.9) a HC trial. Each trial i for subject j is classified as either 
‘LC’ or ‘HC’ based on the median of the calculated conflict (eqn. 1) for all trials in each of 
all three sessions. For ease of understanding, we refer to HC as difficult and LC as easy trials 
in subsequent sections. 
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Uncertainty was based on the variance of the reward probability distribution (Figure-
1b) of each stimulus (Schultz et al., 2008)  
( ), , ,1i i ix j x j x jU P P= −                                        (2) 
Where ,
i
x jU is the uncertainty variable, ,
i
x jP is the reward probability of the transitioned 
stimulus ‘x’ at stage 2 for trial i and subject j.  The probabilities for each stimulus ranged 
between 0.25 and 0.75 varying as a slow Gaussian walk across the trials. We then defined 
three ranges of probabilities (G1: P=0.25–0.45, G2: P=0.46–0.55 and G3: P=0.56–0.75) 
(Figure-1b table) to categorize the levels of uncertainty: For a given instance, the trial was 
classified to either low (both stimuli come under G1/G3 or their combination); medium (one 
stimulus falls under G1 or G3 and the other under G2) or high (both stimuli fall under G2) 
Each of the difficult high conflict trials were further categorised into low(HCLU), 
medium(HCMU) or high uncertainty(HCHU) and easy low conflict only into either 
low(LCLU) or medium(LCMU)(Figure-1b).  For example, in trial i, the probabilities 
associated with the stimuli are both low (PA=0.25; PB=0.30, Figure-1b table); although the 
probabilities are low, the certainty with which the subject could estimate the reward outcome 
is high, thereby defining the trial as a difficult-certain one(HCLU, see Figure-1c). Due to the 
task design, the participants do not experience any trials with easy low conflict high 
uncertainty(LCHU) condition. This categorical approach of dividing the uncertainty is just a 
discretized version of the sum of individual uncertainties (See Supp. Fig.S7), which provides 
an opportunity to study the psychological processes when the two options are both low or 
high uncertainty or a combination of high and low uncertainties. 
To summarize, conflict reflects the difference in the reward probabilities between 
stimuli pairs and depends on the relationship between the 2 stimuli whereas uncertainty 
reflects the variance in the probability of a single stimulus and is independent of the other 
stimulus, making them conceptually different. 
 
Insert Figure1- Pictorial representation of the sequential learning task, hierarchical drift 
diffusion model with examples of conflict and uncertainty trials.  
 
Hierarchical Drift Diffusion model (HDDM) 
 HDDM falls under the class of sequential sampling methods which utilizes Bayesian 
methods to estimate the drift diffusion model parameters such as the threshold(a) and the drift 
rate(v), starting bias(z) and non-decision time(t). We focus our analysis on the parameters 
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a(threshold at which an action is taken) and drift rate v (cognitive/perceptual information 
processing speed)(Voss et al., 2013; Forstmann et al., 2016) because of their importance in 
earlier conflict- uncertainty studies(Frank, 2006; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2012; Banca et al., 
2015). The Bayesian based HDDM, estimates a and v parameters as posterior probability 
distributions with the mean of the distribution representing the group’s average. The model 
utilizes the Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling method to estimate the distributions. The 
prior distribution for each parameter was based on 23 studies which reported the best fitting 
DDM parameters for multiple cognitive tasks(Matzke and Wagenmakers, 2009; Wiecki et al., 
2013). The pre-analysis code was written in MATLAB version 2017a and the built-in HDDM 
python package by(Wiecki et al., 2013) was used for the parameter estimation.  
Hierarchical drift diffusion model package can use explicitly defined variables such as 
the categorical conflict(LC or HC) / uncertainty(all 5 categories) to influence the estimation 
of the parameters. These conflict and uncertainty inputs to the HDDM model are categorical 
variables rather than their numerical values. We used a total of 3 models to analyse the task 
data independently. The first 2 models allowed either conflict(C) or uncertainty(U) to 
influence the sampling and estimation and the third model uses both C and U(Figure-1c). 
Another popular approach(Frank et al., 2015) where a single threshold and drift rate are 
estimated which would reflect the regression with degree of conflict was not utilized in this 
study. This is mainly because of 2 reasons:1) It would have been very complicated to study 
the interaction with uncertainty given that uncertainty was set up as non-linear categorical 
one. Second, the approach we followed in the manuscript allows us to estimate the 
parameters based on the trial type (E.g.: easy versus difficult in conflict) which addresses the 
primary objective of the study. 
Due to the randomness in the experimental design,  only 155 out of the 173 subjects 
in HV, 30 out of 31 subjects in OCD and 37 out of 38 subjects experienced all the conflict-
uncertainty conditions and were included for analysis in this last model. The trials with 
response times below 50ms or no response were excluded from the analysis to ensure model 
convergence and to constrain the data to realistic response times. The parameters were 
estimated by drawing 20000 samples with the first 1000 samples being discarded as burn-in. 
The convergence of the model was assessed by both visual inspection of the chains and 
computation of the Gelman-Rubin statistic, which indicated convergence (R^<1.1)(Krypotos 
et al., 2015). We also calculated the deviance information criterion(DIC) which evaluates a 
model’s goodness-of-fit while accounting for model complexity(i.e., number of free 
parameters), with lower DIC values indicating a better model fit(Spiegelhalter et al., 2002).  
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Statistical Analyses 
In line with the HDDM estimation of a and v, we used Bayesian methods as 
implemented in JASP(Team, 2017) for statistical analysis. Bayesian repeated measures 
ANOVA was used to test the significance across groups, conditions and their interactions 
and, if significant, post-hoc Bayesian paired and independent t-tests were used to assess the 
mean difference. Evidence for hypothesis testing was inferred from the Bayes Factors(BF10), 
with a BF10 >3 indicating moderate evidence and >10 strong evidence in support of the 
alternate hypothesis(Krypotos et al., 2015).  The Bayes Factor used to report the evidence for 
(or against) a hypothesis was obtained from JASP which is based on the algorithm described 
in (Team, 2017; Wagenmakers et al., 2018a; Wagenmakers et al., 2018b). The behavioural 
(response time and accuracy) and demographic measures were analysed using frequentist 
repeated measures ANOVA and post-hoc Bonferroni corrected independent paired and 
sample t-tests using SPSS version25.  
 The HDDM estimates–threshold(a) and drift rate(v) from the conflict alone 
model(easy versus difficult) were analysed using Bayesian paired-sample t-test to assess the 
effect of conflict. We then analysed the relationship between HDDM estimates without 
conflict or uncertainty as dependents and reinforcement learning parameters(Daw et al., 
2011), model-based and model-free behavioural measures, working memory, age and gender 
to assess any possible relationships. We then addressed the main hypotheses of differences 
between healthy and patient population using repeated measures ANOVA followed by post-
hoc tests for the estimated HDDM values. 
Since the DIC value for the combined conflict and uncertainty model was the lowest 
compared to conflict or uncertainty alone model, the thresholds and drift rates across groups 




 The groups did not differ by gender(proportion male: HV:46.8%; OCD:43.8%; AD: 
60.5%(χ2(2,N=243)=2.68,p=ns)) but differed by age(F(2,242)=12.04,p<.001), with 
AD(mean=43.68, SD=12.27) older than HV(mean=32.44, SD=12.79) (t(209)=4.94, p < .001) 
and OCD(mean=34.66, SD=13.40)(t(68)=2.94, p< .01). Age did not differ between OCD and 
HV(t(203)=0.89, p= ns).  
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Behavioural measures: accuracy and response times 
Effect of Conflict 
Two separate mixed measures ANOVAs including group as a between-subject 
variable and conflict(difficult and easy) as a within-subject variable were conducted. In terms 
of response times, the main effect of conflict was significant(F(1,240)=5.86, p <.05), 
indicating slower response times during HC(reported as mean ± standard deviation 
816±175ms) than LC(798±175ms), with no group by conflict interaction(F(2,240)=2.25, 
p=ns) or group effect(F(2,240)=.65, p=ns). In terms of accuracy, there was no main effect of 
conflict(F(2,240)=.02, p=ns), group by conflict interaction(F(2,240)=.10, p=ns), or group 
effect(F(2,240)=.10, p=ns). 
 
Effect of Conflict-Uncertainty 
Two separate mixed measures ANOVAs were conducted including group as a 
between-subject variable and conflict-uncertainty(HCHU,HCMU, HCLU,LCMU and LCLU) 
as a within-subject variable. In terms of response times, there was no main effect of conflict-
uncertainty(F(2,218)=1.92, p=ns), but showed group by conflict-uncertainty 
interaction(F(2,218)=4.09, p<0.001), with OCD patients taking longer times to respond in 
LCMU(t(183)=3.37, p<.01; OCD:821±167ms; HV:740±110ms) and AD in 
HCLU(t(189)=2.59, p <.05; AD:814 ±161ms; HV:756±111ms) and LCMU(t(189)=2.63, 
p<.05; AD:801±180ms; HV:740±110ms) conditions than healthy volunteers.  
In terms of accuracy, there was a main effect of conflict-uncertainty(F(2,218)= 
48.706, p<0.001) and group by conflict-uncertainty interaction(F(2,218)=8.07, p<0.001) 
effect. The OCD patients performed poorly relative to HV(t(183)=-4.69, p <0.01; AOCD:0.36 
±0.15, AHV:0.49 ±0.14) and AD(t(64)=-2.84, p<0.05; AAD:0.48±0.2) in the HCHU(difficult-
uncertain) condition and better relative to AD(t(64)=3.17,p=0.01;AOCD:0.61±0.12, 
AAD:0.53±0.1) in LCMU condition. AD patients relative to HV were worse only in 
LCMU(t(189)=-4.29, p < 0.01; AAD:0.53 ±0.1, AHV:0.6 ±0.09) condition. 
Threshold and Drift rates as function of conflict 
Conflict based HDDM estimates in healthy volunteers 
In order the confirm the validity of our approach, we first compared the estimates for 
difficult relative to easy choices(HC versus LC) in healthy volunteers using a Bayesian 
paired-sample t-test, demonstrating, as expected, strong evidence for slower drift 
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rates(99.99% of vLC>vHC with BF10=2.7x10
20) and moderate evidence for higher 
thresholds(76% of aHC >aLC with BF10=3.2)(Figure 2).  
We further assessed the HDDM estimates for correlations with reinforcement learning 
parameters (see(Daw et al., 2011)  and Supp. for the results), age, gender, and working 
memory. The HDDM estimates(a and v) showed moderate to strong evidence for lack of 
correlation with reinforcement learning parameters(Supp. Table 1)(randomness-β1&β2, 
learning rate-η1&η2, preservation-ps and model free-model based weight-w(Voon et al., 
2015), and behavioural model-based and model-free measures) except for β2. Lower drift 
rates(v)(slower rate of processing) were associated(Supp. Fig.S1) with higher choice 
randomness or exploration at the second stage(β2: r=0.28, BF10=115.6). There was also 
strong evidence for a lack of a correlation with age and moderate evidence for a lack of 
correlation with working memory and no variation with gender(Supp. Table 1). 
Insert Figure 2- Conflict based Hierarchical drift diffusion model estimates for Healthy 
Volunteers 
 
Conflict based HDDM results between groups (HV, OCD and AD)  
We then analysed the HDDM results of threshold and drift rate separately as a 
function of group and conflict using two mixed measures Bayesian ANOVA with group as a 
between-subjects factor and conflict as a within-subjects factor. 
With respect to threshold ‘a’ we found strong evidence for a group effect(BF10=9911) 
and moderate evidence for no group by conflict interaction(BF01=5.6). On post-hoc testing, 
the Bayesian independent sample t-test showed strong evidence for both patient groups to 
have higher thresholds(Fig.3) than healthy volunteers for both low and high conflict 
conditions(AD-HC: 99.68% of aAD>aHV with BF10=89.81; AD-LC: 99.88% of aAD>aHV with 
BF10=232.28; OCD-HC: 99.1% of aHV<aOCD with BF10=2209; OCD-LC: 99.4% of aHV<aOCD 
with BF10=7628).  
With respect to drift rates ‘v’, we showed strong evidence for a conflict 
effect(BF10=6.14x10
25) and very weak evidence for a group effect(BF10=2.5).  Here though 
we showed strong evidence for a conflict by group interaction(BF10=56.68), the Bayesian 
independent sample t-test showed strong to moderate evidence for AD to have slower drift 
rates compared to healthy volunteers(99.5% of vAD<vHV with BF10=113.9) and to OCD(81.9% 
vAD<vOCD with BF10=3.6) during easy(LC) but not difficult(HC) decisions(Supp. Table S2). 
However, there was no evidence for difference in drift rates(BF10=1.4, vHC≠vLC) in AD 
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patients as a function of conflict. This indicates that the conflict level in a given trial failed to 
modulate the drift rates(see Supp. Fig.S2) in AD subjects when compared to 
OCD(BF10=6827, vHC≠vLC) or HV. 
 
Insert Figure 3- Comparison of conflict based hierarchical drift diffusion model estimates 
across healthy volunteers and patient groups 
 
Put together, ADs were slower to process evidence(lower drift rates) during easy-low 
conflict relative to both OCD and healthy volunteers. Both AD and OCD accumulated more 
evidence(higher thresholds) relative to healthy volunteers but not as a function of conflict. 
 
The drift rate of the OCD group showed a positive correlation with β2 alone(Supp. 
Table S1). Unlike HV and OCD, the AD group’s measures showed no relationship with any 
of the reinforcement learning parameters(Supp. Table S1). 
 
Threshold and Drift rates as function of conflict and uncertainty 
To understand the interaction between conflict and uncertainty, we then focused our 
main analyses on the combined conflict-uncertainty model comparing thresholds and drift 
rates across groups and multiple conflict and uncertainty level conditions(HCHU, HCMU, 
HCLU, LCMU and LCLU). The DIC analyses supported such an approach, indicating that 
the combined conflict-uncertainty model had the best fit(82323.25) compared to conflict 
alone(89417.19) or uncertainty alone(82490.01) models. For uncertainty based HDDM model 
estimates  see  Supplementary FigureS3.   
 
HDDM results in healthy volunteers 
We first ran a repeated measures ANOVA of the conflict-uncertainty conditions in the 
healthy volunteers alone and showed a main conflict-uncertainty effect(BF10=24.28).  The 
post-hoc bayesian paired sampled t-tests showed very strong evidence for lower thresholds 
(Figure 4c) for difficult-uncertain decisions(HCHU) compared to difficult-certain 
decisions(HCLU)(84.9% of aHCHU<aHCLU with BF10=182.4) (Supp. Table 3).  
 
Insert Figure 4- Conflict-uncertainty based Hierarchical drift diffusion model estimates for 
Healthy Volunteers 
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With respect to drift rates, we showed strong evidence for the main conflict 
uncertainty effect(BF10=7.22 x10
50) with independent t-tests also showing strong evidence for 
all combinations of uncertainty and conflict, with the lowest drift rate for difficult-
uncertain(HCHU) and the highest for easy-certain(LCLU) choices(Supp. Table 3). 
 
HDDM results between groups.   
For threshold, the mixed measures ANOVA with group as a between-subjects factor 
and conflict-uncertainty conditions as a within-subjects factor showed strong evidence for a 
group effect(BF10=13764.98). The post-hoc Bayesian t-test showed both OCD (strong 
evidence) and AD (moderate evidence) groups had higher thresholds than healthy volunteers 
across all the conflict-uncertainty conditions(Figure 5, Supp. Table 4). 
For drift rate, the mixed measures ANOVA showed moderate to strong evidence for a 
group effect(BF10=6.4), a conflict-uncertainty condition effect(BF10=1.45x10
68) and their 
interaction(BF10=30.76). Post-hoc independent t-tests showed these effects were driven by 
slower drift rates in OCD patients relative to healthy volunteers only when the trials were 
both difficult and uncertain (HCHU)(73.1% of vOCD<vHV with BF10=21.7).  Thus, OCD 
appear to have slower processing speed of sensory evidence during difficult and uncertain 
scenarios. Similar to the results observed in the conflict alone model, AD subjects showed 
slower processing speed only during easy low conflicting scenarios despite the level of 
uncertainty(LCMU= vHV >vAD with BF10=244.12 and LCLU= vHV >vAD with BF10=22.46).  
 
Insert Figure 5- Comparison of conflict based hierarchical drift diffusion model estimates 
across healthy volunteers and patient groups 
 
These results were corroborated in post-hoc comparisons of the patient groups: OCD 
showed strong evidence for higher thresholds relative to AD only during difficult-uncertain 
trials(99.6% of aOCD >aAD with BF10=11.2).  Similarly OCD showed faster drift rates relative 
to AD when choices were easy irrespective of uncertainty levels(LCMU(95.4% of vCD >vAD 
with BF10=12.6) and LCLU(96.32% of vOCD>vAD with BF10=6.6)) (Supp. Table 4).   
In the behavioural analysis, OCD patients showed impaired accuracy relative to 
HV(t(183)=-4.69, p<0.01; AOCD:0.36±0.153, AHV:0.49±0.14) and AD(t(64)=-2.84, p<0.05; 
AAD:0.48±0.2) in the difficult-uncertain(HCHU) condition.  There were no differences in 
reaction times(For more details, see behavioural results).  
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Discussion 
We applied a novel analysis investigating evidence accumulation of a sequential 
learning task dissociating conflict(as a function of the difference in probabilities between the 
two choices) and uncertainty(as a function of the variance in outcomes of either choice). We 
first validated this approach in healthy volunteers, and then compared the findings in 
disorders of pathology characterized by impaired decision making.  
The effects of conflict on threshold and drift rates in healthy volunteers were as 
expected(Frank et al., 2007; Zaghloul et al., 2012) thus validating our approach: the threshold 
or the amount of evidence accumulated is higher and drift rate or the speed of evidence 
accumulation is slower during difficult versus easy decisions(HC versus LC)(Frank, 2006). 
As the task was originally designed to investigate the relative balance of goal-directed and 
habitual control, we also assessed the relationship between evidence accumulation and 
reinforcement learning measures.  There was no relationship between threshold or drift rate 
and goal-directed and habit control or learning parameters of the reinforcement learning 
algorithm parameters or behavioural model free- model based measures.  However, the drift 
rate positively correlated with the second stage randomness parameter(β2) in healthy 
volunteers. The ‘β2’ parameter(inverse of temperature in soft-max) controls the exploitative 
or explorative levels during decision making with low values corresponding to greater 
exploration or choice randomness(Sutton and Barto, 1998). Thus, individuals with higher 
exploitation, or greater tendency to stick with the choice with the highest reward probability 
rather than sampling alternate options, have a faster build-up of evidence prior to a decision. 
Those with greater exploration tendencies have a slower build-up of evidence.  This 
relationship was also observed in OCD but not AD subjects. Although there were no 
differences between AD and healthy controls in β2(Voon et al., 2015), we have previously 
shown that the same AD group have lower exploratory behaviours on a different explore-
exploit task(Morris et al., 2016).  Although these measures differ, this observation may 
account for the lack of correlation between drift rate and β2 in AD.  Further studies to clarify 
this observation are indicated. 
We then show a critical interaction between conflict and uncertainty in healthy 
volunteers, where threshold was modulated not just by conflict, but also the degree of 
uncertainty within the choices.  When choices were easy and certain(LCLU), the 
accumulation of evidence was lower(low threshold) and at a faster rate(high drift rate).  The 
opposite was observed when the choices were difficult but certain: when the likelihood of an 
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outcome is certain but choosing between two choices is difficult(HCLU), here we cautiously 
accumulate more evidence (high threshold) at a slower rate (low drift rate). This suggests that 
the degree of conflict between choices is driving the rate of evidence accumulation.   
Critically however, when we need to make decisions between choices which are 
difficult but uncertain, (i.e. when the individual likelihood of the stimuli outcomes is 
uncertain or risky and closer to chance(P~0.50) and choosing between the two choices is 
difficult, HCHU), we unexpectedly do the opposite: we accumulate less evidence (lower 
threshold) as compared to options where the return is more certain.  Thus in the context of 
greater difficulty, the level of uncertainty appears to be a crucial factor. Unlike other conflict-
uncertain scenarios where systematic evidence accumulation occurs, when faced with 
difficult choices with too much uncertainty, less evidence is accumulated and evaluated 
before making a decision.  
We then compared the estimates from the patient groups to healthy volunteers 
obtained from conflict and conflict-uncertainty models. The conflict model showed that OCD 
subjects modulated their drift rates but not thresholds depending on conflict level whereas 
AD patients failed to adjust either with no difference as a function of conflict (see conflict 
based model AD result). Although OCD patients accumulated more evidence during either 
easy or difficult trials, there was no significant difference in terms of accuracy or response 
time relative to healthy volunteers suggesting that conflict per se was not an issue. However, 
in the context of the interaction between high conflict and high uncertainty(HCHU) 
conditions, OCD subjects had slower processing speed for the sensory evidence yet 
unexpectedly showed worse performance reflected in their low accuracy levels.  Thus, we 
suggest that impaired evidence accumulation in OCD is not specific to either conflict or 
uncertainty, but rather an interaction between the two factors. 
 
This abnormal evidence accumulation behaviour may be related to a strategy used to 
reduce the presumed uncertainty associated with the choices with increase in doubt(Hermans 
et al., 2008) and may be related to their ‘checking’ symptomatology(van den Hout and Kindt, 
2003b; Dar, 2004; van den Hout and Kindt, 2004).  This slower processing speed in OCD 
subjects appears to be specific to difficult and uncertain scenarios.  This combination of 
slowed but sub-optimal performance in OCD is intriguing.  Healthy controls appear to be 
more impulsive and accumulate less evidence in difficult uncertain contexts and perform at 
chance accuracy levels which is expected given the context(P=0.46 to 0.55 for both stimuli). 
That the choice is more rapid relative to easier and less conflictual contexts suggests the 
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healthy controls are aware of the difficult or the near impossible nature of the context and 
hence make a rapid and perhaps more random decision consistent with the chance 
performance.  In contrast, OCD subjects appear to be more deliberative and cautious in this 
context.  Critically, however, OCD subjects perform sub-optimally with accuracy rates much 
lower than chance; that they choose the wrong choice suggests that they must have learned 
the probabilities and are implicitly aware of the difference between choices but yet persist in 
poor performance.  This suggests the issue is not one of learning differences in contingencies 
highlighting dissociation between learning and performance.   
 
This context of high uncertainty and conflict is an ecologically valid model in OCD. 
For instance, an OCD individual with cleanliness and washing compulsive behaviours needs 
to make a decision: ‘Are my hands clean enough to stop washing?’  They must decide 
whether their objectively clean hands are sufficiently subjectively clean to either continue or 
stop handwashing.  The decision is highly conflictual as in a pathological state, the decision 
is not between dirty and clean but between patient’s highly subjective of a feeling or belief of 
being ‘clean enough’ or ‘not clean enough’. The outcomes are also highly uncertain as 
neither stopping nor continuing changes the highly ambiguous and subjective nature of these 
outcomes.  Subjects then deliberate further or are more cautious and accumulate more 
evidence but critically despite being implicitly aware of the different choices, they perform 
poorly and make the wrong judgement.  This is in keeping with the subjective clinical 
experience that the obsessions and compulsions are ‘ego-dystonic’: that they are aware that 
the behaviour is somehow wrong or inconsistent with their goals yet the behaviour persists.  
Subjects may also have difficulties in appreciating the specific contextual difference(i.e. 
recognizing or appreciating the impossibility of a difficult uncertain decision), have over-
active performance monitoring and be overly concerned about making mistakes(have 
impairments in balancing cost-benefit), or have difficulties in switching between decision 
policies with respect to specific contextual changes(Endrass et al., 2008; Riesel et al., 2011; 
Agam et al., 2014; Riesel, 2014; Weinberg et al., 2015; Gillan et al., 2017). These findings 
also might highlight why the literature on OCD is mixed with respect to sensitivity to conflict 
or uncertainty as the interaction is the critical issue.   
 
In contrast, AD patients appear to have more specific difficulties with conflict.  When 
compared to HV and OCD, AD showed slower processing speeds(drift rates) during low 
relative to high conflict. In this case, what should be an easy decision perhaps more obvious 
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to others is approached similar to a difficult decision.  These findings are consistent with 
previous observations that AD show reduced discrimination of conflict(Beylergil et al., 2017) 
and risk levels(Zhu et al., 2016) with reported conflict-related deficits in dorso-lateral 
prefrontal cortex(DLPFC)(Boschin et al., 2016; Beylergil et al., 2017). In humans, the rate of 
evidence accumulation or the drift rate has been linked to the fronto-parietal network (Mulder 
et al., 2014). The impairment in ability to adjust their drift rates with respect to the conflict 
level maybe similarly related to their deficits in DLPFC activity.  
Both computational models captured the group differences in parameters not observed 
in the behavioural data. The final performance metric(accuracy or response time) is a 
weighted combination of multiple cognitive processes occurring simultaneously whereas the 
HDDM parameters represent the underlying components of this process which may otherwise 
be camouflaged in behavioural metrics. These parameter estimates indicate how 
computational models can help identify more subtle pathological changes(e.g. decreased drift 
rate in AD) which may not yet manifest behaviourally in performance.  
Our study is not without limitations.  The response duration for evaluating the second 
stage choice was limited to 2 seconds which might differentially impact more difficult 
choices which could be a reason that we observed moderate evidence for a higher 
threshold(a) during high relative to low conflict condition.  However, that we show that OCD 
subjects differ from healthy controls in the difficult-uncertain condition suggests that the 
response duration is not a limiting factor. We have used objective reward probabilities(P) 
rather than learned subjective/ learned probabilities in the analysis. The rewards are binary 
stochastic with an implicit component of uncertainty making their explicit estimation 
difficult.  Learned probabilities are known to lag behind the objective probability and to be 
more imprecise.  However, as the objective probabilities were binned into low, medium and 
high, the subject was only required to distinguish them broadly between stimuli rather than a 
more fine grained difference. These arguments support our approach of using objective 
probabilities for this analysis. But as the rationale behind the 2-step task design was neither to 
study conflict nor uncertainty, utilizing it to study the psychological constructs of trial-wise 
variations in conflict/uncertainty may require more refinement of the task structure or to 
analyse the learned subjective probabilities particularly if using a regressor rather than a 
categorical approach. This categorical approach of defining the uncertainty using both the 
available options differs from methods that might take choice into account. In future studies, 
we would like to use the uncertainty associated with the selected choice and compare it with 
the manuscript’s uncertainty categorization. Despite having an imbalance in the number of 
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trials among different conflict and uncertainty conditions, the minimum of number of trials 
required to achieve high precision in the parameter estimation was maintained in the model. 
Thus, we highlight a critical role for uncertainty in the context of difficult or high 
conflict trials. Healthy volunteers accumulate less evidence with difficult uncertain decisions, 
perhaps reflecting a switch to a more random decision policy. In contrast, OCD subjects 
behave more cautiously, accumulating more evidence, yet perform sub-optimally below 
chance levels.  In contrast, AD subjects show a main impairment in conflict processing.  Here 
we highlight the multidimensionality underlying the observation of compulsive or repeated 
behaviours in OCD or AD.  Although we observe impairments in evidence accumulation in 
both patient groups, which may be interpreted as cautiousness, indecision, or slowness, we 
highlight the critical differences in context. Together these observations may provide insight 
into therapeutic strategies targeting core cognitive deficits. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1.  Schematic of the sequential learning task with examples of conflict and uncertainty 
trials and hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM). 1a shows a graphical representation of 
the 2-step task and its stages including the transition durations. Subjects choose between a 
stimulus-pair at the first stage which transitions with fixed probability to one of two stimulus-
pairs at the second stage.  The graph shows the gradually changing probability of reward of 
the second stage stimuli based on a random Gaussian walk.  1b shows uncertainty as a 
function of reward probability (stage 2) with the table listing the probability range of the two 
choices and their combinations to form each of the uncertainty conditions (LU= Low 
uncertainty, MU= Medium uncertainty, HU=High uncertainty). 1c provides an example 
across one block of each trial of reward probabilities (top row); conflict based on equation 1 
(middle row); and uncertainty based on equation 2 (bottom row). 1d shows the pictorial 
representation of the HDDM where a (threshold) and v (drift rate) vary as function of conflict 
(C) and uncertainty (U) for subject (S), with the total number of trials (‘T’) per subject for 
each experimental group - Healthy Volunteers (HV), Obsessive Compulsive disorder (OCD) 
and Alcohol dependents (AD).  
Figure 2.  Conflict based Hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM) estimates across 
Healthy Volunteers (HV).  Plot of the posterior distributions of (2a) threshold and (2b) drift-
rate for HV (N = 173 subjects), in easy (low conflict, LC) and difficult decisions (high 
conflict, HC) (** BF10 >3, ***>10)  
Figure 3. Group level Posterior distributions (3a) drift-rate (v) and (3b) threshold (a) for 
difficult (high conflict, HC) and easy decisions (low conflict, LC) for healthy volunteers 
(HV), obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) and alcohol dependence (AD). The evidence for 
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differences between the groups was calculated using BF10 (supplementary Table SIII; ** BF10 
> 3, *** > 10).  
Figure 4. Posterior distribution for the conflict and conflict-uncertainty model for healthy 
volunteers (n = 155) for thresholds (4a and 4c) and drift rates (4b and 4d). The evidence for 
differences between the distributions is indicated by BF10 (** >3, ***>100) for difficult 
uncertain (High Conflict High uncertainty - HCHU) and difficult-certain (High Conflict Low 
uncertainty -HCLU) condition  
Figure 5. Mean thresholds and mean drift rates for healthy volunteers (HV), obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD) and alcohol dependence (AD) as a function of conflict-
uncertainty conditions. Moderate evidence is indicated by ** BF > 3, and strong evidence by 
*** BF > 10. (HCHU =High conflict high uncertainty, HCLU= High conflict low 
uncertainty, LCLU = Low conflict low uncertainty). 
 
